All-Embracing Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation & 'Moderate Originalism

• Author: Stephen Puttick
• Position: JD candidate, University of Western Australia. The author wishes to thank to Dr Natalie Skead and Mr Brad Papaluca for their insightful and instructive comments on earlier versions of this paper. Of course, any errors remain the author's own
• Pages: 30-56

University of Western Australia Law Review Vol 42:30

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ALL-EMBRACING APPROACHES TO CONSTITUTIONAL

INTERPRETATION & ‘MODERATE ORIGINALISM’

STEPHEN PUTTICK*

This paper is separated into two parts. First, the author examines some of the

normative considerations for and against judges openly enunciating and consistently

applying all-embracing approaches to constitutional interpretation – a development

that Justice Kirby has previously advocated. In this regard, the author also recounts

a number of recent and historical examples of the at times inconsistent and ad hoc

approaches applied when interpreting the Constitution. Second, the author turns to

examine some of the alternative methods available in constitutional interpretation.

The author argues that a form of ‘moderate originalism’ is the most useful and

justified of these approaches. In this respect the author draws on the contributions of

various theorists, as well as responding to some recent criticisms made of originalist

theory.

I Introduction ...........................................................................................................31

II The Primary Claim: An All-Embracing Approach ..............................................32

A An All-Embracing Approach? .....................................................................32

1 Kirby J’s view ..........................................................................................33

2 Some examples .........................................................................................34

(a) Section 92 and Cole v Whitfield .......................................................35

(b) Dawson J, s 80 and McGinty ............................................................36

(c) The marriage power and same-sex marriage ...................................38

3 Arguments For and Against .....................................................................40

(a) The Kirby view ..................................................................................40

(b) Gummow J and others ......................................................................41

(c) An approach meriting all-embracing application .............................42

III The Secondary Claim: Non-Origanlism And Alternative Methods ...................43

A Questions .....................................................................................................44

B Application ...................................................................................................44

1 Literalism .................................................................................................44

2 ‘Collective Legislative Intention’ .............................................................45

3 Originalism and non-originalism .............................................................46

(a) Moderate Originalism .......................................................................46

(i) Dead Hand of the Past? .................................................................48

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* JD candidate, University of Western Australia. The author wishes to thank to Dr Natalie Skead and Mr

Brad Papaluca for their insightful and instructive comments on earlier versions of this paper. Of course,

any errors remain the author’s own.

[2017] All Embracing Approaches to Constitutional

Interpretation & ‘Moderate Originalism’

31

(ii) Subordinate principles ..................................................................49

(iii) Flexibility? ..................................................................................51

(b) Methodological Issues for the Originalist ........................................53

(i) Can Judges ‘Do’ History? ..............................................................53

(ii) Responses .....................................................................................54

(iii) Objective and Subjective Intentions ............................................55

IV Conclusion ..........................................................................................................56

I INTRODUCTION

In 2000 Kirby J proclaimed that ‘[t]here is no task performed by a Justice of the

High Court which is more important than the task of interpreting the Constitution’.1

In Eastman v The Queen, a case decided that same year, his Honour proffered curially

the supposed desirability of adopting a single approach to constitutional interpretation

‘lest the inconsistencies… of whichever result produces a desired outcome’

perpetuate.2 Gummow J and others have disagreed with this view.3 To date the High

Court has not taken heed of Kirby’s advice. Single unifying approaches have not been

embraced.

This paper is separated into two parts. First, the author critically exam ines

Kirby’s assertion that judges should adhere to a single, coherent approach to

constitutional interpretation - the primary claim. Arguments for and against such a

development are evaluated. Ultimately it is argued that the enunciation of, and

adherence to, single all-embracing approaches would be a positive development.

Second, the author turns to examine some possible alternative interpretive

approaches, including the non-originalism that Kirby has advocated - the secondary

claim. It is arg ued that a form of ‘moderate originalism’4 is the most useful and

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1 Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form of Ancestor

Worship?’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 1, 8. As our fundamental law the Constitution

allocates and regulates government power, as well as affording some rights protections. Therefore,

interpretation can have profound consequences. (Mis)interpretation cannot be ea sily ‘corrected’ through

the formal amendment procedures in s 128.

2 (2000) 203 CLR 1, 79-81

3 See, e.g., SGH Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 210 CLR 51, 75 [41]-[42] which is

discussed in greater detail post. See further, by way of introduction, e.g., Greg Craven, ‘Original Intent

and the Australian Constitution – Coming Soon to a Court Near You?’ (1990) 1 Public Law Review 166,

167.

4 The learned writer Jeffrey Goldsworthy has used the term ‘moderate originalism’ to describe his

preferred method of constitutional interpretation. I use the phrase here to describe that same method. The

approach will be examined further in the succeeding pages, however I could not claim that this essay is

any way a substitute for Goldsworthy’s prodigious contribution to the field. Other writers have also

advocated a similar approach to that put forward by Goldsworthy. See also, e.g., Craven, above n 3;

Lawrence B Solum, ‘District of Columbia v Heller and Originalism’ (2009) 103 Northwestern University

Law Review 923, 933; Keith F Whittington ‘The New Originalism’ (2004) 2 Georgetown Journal of Law

and Public Policy 599, 605. Some have questioned whether this new approach really differs from

traditional iterations of originalism, see e.g., Richard S Kay ‘Original Intention and Pub lic Meaning in