Peacekeeping and the Lusaka Protocol *.

• Jurisdiction: Australia
• Date: 01 January 1999
• Author: Hewitt, Dawn M.
• Published date: 01 January 1999
• Author: Hewitt, Dawn M.

Few governments are more deserving of revolutionary overthrow than that of President Eduardo dos Santos. Few rebel movements are less deserving to accomplish that overthrow than that of Jonas Savimbi.

Simon Barber

In 1993, Angola was in the eighteenth year of a civil war which pitted the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government against National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents. (1) During that year, perhaps 1,000 people a day died. (2) But the renewed Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) felt they were on their way to victory. The government had hired extensive outside assistance from security firms such as South Africa's Executive Outcomes. FAA Sukhoi and MiG aircraft, many flown by foreign pilots, strafed the Central Highlands held by UNITA's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA).

Rather than allowing the war to run its course and fearful that it could continue for years to come, the international community pressed hard for a cease-fire. Talks started in Lusaka, Zambia in December 1993. However, every time it looked like there was progress toward a cease-fire and a peace agreement, the war in Angola would intensify as each side sought an advantage on the ground to gain extra leverage in Lusaka.

Through great perseverance, UN Special Representative Alouine Blondin Beye oversaw the hammering out of the Lusaka Protocol, which was initialed by all parties on 31 October 1994. Although war still swept Angola, the UN was charged with overseeing the implementation of the protocol's provisions. The main vehicle for this was the Joint Commission chaired by the UN. There would be representatives from UNITA and the MPLA, and an observer from each of the Troika nations (Portugal, Russia, United States) who would assist in resolving disputes. The Lusaka Protocol called for the formation of a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) to be followed by the second round of the presidential elections, canceled due to a return to war in October 1992. (3) Government troops would be confined to barracks and UNITA troops quartered. A unified army under civilian control would be formed and excess forces demobilized. Mercenaries would be expelled from Angola and UNITA troops incorporated into the Angolan National Police (ANP). State administration would be extended to all of Angola. UNITA's Radio VORGAN, a means of militant mass propaganda, was to be transformed into a non-partisan radio station. (4)

In the next four years, the international community poured USS 1.5 billion into the Lusaka Protocol process. (5) The UN provided two missions, first the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) III, then from 1 July 1997 the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). With so much investment, both political and material, why was the UN unable to stop Angola's return to conflict in 1998?

The United Nations Charter has two chapters dealing with peace operations. Chapter VI typically requires the consent of both parties and includes preventive deployments and classic peacekeeping operations in which the UN interposes troops between two forces who have agreed to cease hostile operations. Chapter VII has been used to restore or maintain peace and security and allows the use of coercive force. (6) UNAVEM III was deployed under a Chapter VI mandate. It was presumed the Lusaka Protocol signed by both parties provided for a cease-fire and the insertion of UN forces. Yet, these assumptions were incorrect. UNITA leader Savimbi refused to sign the Lusaka Protocol. Instead, UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola signed the document. (7) Neither was there a cease-fire. Fighting intensified after the 31 October initialing of the Lusaka Protocol and MPLA/UNITA clashes continued following the 20 November ceremony. (8) Another cease-fire had to be signed on 3 February. (9)

Despite the dubious cease-fire, on 8 February 1995 UNSC Resolution 960 was passed establishing UNAVEM III with a maximum deployment of 7,000 military peacekeepers, 1350 military observers, and 260 police observers. While the resolution authorized the immediate deployment of planning and support elements, the military peacekeepers would not arrive until the Secretary General received a further report certifying an effective cease-fire, and that both sides had provided all requested military data.

Despite the warning that the UN deployment was contingent upon both sides' cooperation and a countrywide cease-fire, neither side was eager to cooperate fully with UNAVEM. The Security Council in April noted both sides continued military actions, failed to completely disengage, placed restrictions on UNAVEM III, attacked UNAVEM in personnel, and an MPLA airstrike on UNITA-held Andulo airfield. Both sides imported weapons in clear violation of the Lusaka Protocol (under the attached Triple Zero Clause and according to UNSC Resolution 976) and made preparations for renewed war. Nonetheless, the UN Security Council welcomed the Secretary General's decision to proceed with the deployment of military peacekeepers. (10)

As a Chapter VI interposition force was impractical in Angola where UNITA had frequently acted as a guerilla force and there were no clear lines of control, UNAVEM III would deploy to 55 sites in six regions with an overall headquarters in Luanda. Fifteen of those sites would house quartering camps. The downside to the arrangement was that UNAVEM never felt compelled to interpose itself between the warring factions, even when the lines were fairly clear. There was nothing in UNAVEM's mandate to suggest it should engage in conflict prevention. Rather, UNAVEM's mission was: to act as a mediator through the Joint Commission; to monitor the ceasefire (which in practice meant recording cease-fire violation complaints and if possible conducting an investigation and assigning guilt); to oversee the confinement to barracks of FAA forces and the quartering and disarming of UNITA forces; to oversee the extension of state administration; to disarm the civilian populace; to conduct de-mining operations; and to provide humanitarian assistance. (11) UNAVEM's (and later MONUA's) mandate assumed that the MPLA and UNITA desired peace and a united Angola. Therefore, the UN was merely needed to mediate the Lusaka Protocol process, a fatally flawed presumption that led to the collapse of the process in 1998.

Jonas Savimbi had no intention of becoming a backbench MP in an MPLA controlled government. It was why he dragged Angola back to war in 1992 after the collapse of the Bicesse Accord. (12) While the Lusaka Protocol failed to establish a true power-sharing government, it provided UNITA with MPs, four ministries, seven deputy ministerships, several ambassadorships and three provincial governorships. (13) In much of its substance the Lusaka Protocol did not go beyond the Bicesse Accord in that it basically set up a unitary winner-take-all system. At heart, Savimbi wished to avoid an immediate return to conflict, so he eventually gave his cooperation to the United Nations, albeit at the most glacial pace possible.

President dos Santos also appeared to regret signing the Lusaka Protocol. By March 1995, many hard-liners were convinced they had almost taken Angola on the battlefield only to be deprived of their victory by the United Nations. War preparations reached a furious pitch. After a negative report filed by Special Envoy Beye, dos Santos reined in some of the worst sabre rattling and agreed to see if the UN could give him Angola through the UNAVEM III deployment. Cease-fire violations dropped in April and Beye urged the UN Security Council to deploy the military peacekeepers. (14)

Military engineers began deployment in April-May. They had an especially difficult task as roads throughout Angola had blown-out bridges and were heavily mined. Due in part to its lack of air assets and partly because it needed access to the countryside to carry out its mandate, the UN had to de-mine the roads before the six infantry battalions could deploy to their regional sites. (15)

The UN engineers did get some relief in June with the arrival of a Russian Helicopter Aviation Group. Russia sent 160 airmen with 7 Mi-8 Hip helicopters to carry out aerial reconnaissance and assist the UN peacekeepers in their deployment. (16) While the Russian unit was of great assistance, the assets were not sufficient for UNAVEM III to effectively carry out its mission.

The MPLA and UNITA complained of the UN's slow progress in deploying, but the distrust between the belligerents hindered the location and removal of landmines. In fact, the FAA and FALA laid new mines during the course of the summer. (17) The abysmal infrastructure and the massive distrust between the two factions, the UN's inability to lock in national commitments, and the UN's continued failure to get forces to Angola quickly, meant that UNAVEM was still deploying in autumn 1995.

By September, 4,100 peacekeepers were deployed and things improved somewhat for the average Angolan: violence was down except in the diamond regions of the northeast and along the Zaire border; roads were reopening; food was making it to the town markets even in the cities of the Central Highlands which had been devastated in 1994; and people were rebuilding. (18)

According to the Lusaka Protocol, UNITA was to quarter 62,500 soldiers, of whom 26,300 would join the new integrated Angolan Armed Forces (FAA -- the same name as the MPLA's military force). The first quartering camp opened 20 November 1995 at Vila Nova. The day the camp opened the FAA seized control of a supply road in the Soyo region of Zaire province. Province-wide conflict ignited between FALA and FAA forces and consequently on 4 December UNITA halted the quartering of troops at Vila Nova. (19) UNITA also temporarily restricted all UNAVEM movement in its territory. (20) UNAVEM was back to drawing up disengagement plans. (21)

The...