Chapter 11 Regional integration and militarised interstate disputes: An empirical analysis

• Pages: 185-203
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/S1572-8323(2010)0000014015
• Published date: 08 July 2010
• Date: 08 July 2010
• Author: Golam Robbani

CHAPTER 11

REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND

MILITARISED INTERSTATE

DISPUTES: AN EMPIRICAL

ANALYSIS

Golam Robbani

ABSTRACT

Purpose – This chapter aims to position regional integration in the

Kantian peace tripod and to test whether regional economic integration

has a signif‌icant effect in reducing militarised interstate disputes.

Methodology – It uses logistic regression on cross-sectional–time-series

data and a generalised estimating equation.

Findings – The analysis shows that regional integration had a signif‌icant

impact in reducing militarised interstate disputes between 1950 and 2000.

Practical implications – This chapter may provide a new dimension to the

academic discussion on the Kantian peace proposition, and encourage

policy makers in less integrated regions to integrate with their

neighbouring states in a bid to minimise political tensions.

Originality – The chapter is based on original data on regional integration

collected by the author.

Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives

Contributions to Conf‌lict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 14, 185–203

Copyright r2010 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited

All rights of reproduction in any form reserved

ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2010)0000014015

185

INTRODUCTION

Centuries ago, Immanuel Kant (1970[1795]) sketched a philosophical view

of a peaceful world with open commerce, democracy and international

organisations. Considerable research shows that trading nations f‌ight less,

democracies rarely go to war and international organisations have peaceful

impact (Oneal & Russett, 1999a;Russett & Oneal, 2001). Despite the fact

that regional integration arrangements (RIAs) may contain all the three

elements of the Kantian peace tripod, surprisingly little attempt has been

made to empirically assess the impact of RIAs in shaping political relations

among member states. The economic implications of regional integrations

have been widely studied and f‌iercely debated, but analyses of their impact

on political–military relations have been sparse (Mansf‌ield & Pevehouse,

2003).

Although the unprecedented success of the European Union (EU) in

making another regional war ‘unthinkable’ has deeply inf‌luenced policy

makers throughout the world, paradoxically, regional integrations are

largely considered to be an ‘economic’ phenomenon – ignoring their

plausible political benef‌its. With globalisation, the world is facing ever-

increasing ‘problems without passports’ (Annan, 2002) and nation states are

no longer in a position to deal with such challenges. As long as a desired

‘world government’ to manage the ‘global village’ is not in sight, it is time to

re-examine whether the political dimension of regional integration can help.

This chapter investigates whether RIAs have any signif‌icant impact in

reducing militarised interstate disputes (MIDs).

This study builds on empirical analyses that indicate that regional

integrations reduce conf‌lict between states. For example, Mansf‌ield and

Pevehouse (2000, p. 775) demonstrate that parties of the same preferential

trade arrangements (PTA) are less prone to disputes than other states, and

that hostilities between PTA members are less likely to occur as trade f‌lows

rise between them. Their study, however, is based on all the RIAs notif‌ied to

the World Trade Organization (WTO) including bilateral free trade areas

(FTAs). Although it is interesting to see the impact of bilateral agreements

on interstate conf‌lict, the present study excludes bilateral agreements to

single out the effect of commercial intergovernmental organisations (IGOs)

on interstate conf‌lict. Powers (2004, 2006) considers alliance obligations in

regional economic institutions in Africa and f‌inds some pacifying effect, but

reports that ‘African dyads are more likely to f‌ight each other if both

countries are democracies, have increasing disparity in power capabilities,

are allies, and trade with each other’ (Powers, 2006, p. 455). Studying Asia,

GOLAM ROBBANI186