A view from an A.S.I.O. director-general's desk.(Australian Security Intelligence Organisation)

• Author: Miller, John
• Position: 143722960
• Pages: 26(14)

October last year saw the publication of the memoirs of a former Director-General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (A.S.I.O.), Justice Sir (Albert) Edward Woodward, who prefers to be known as Judge Edward Woodward. (1) Unfortunately, this is the only known work by a former Director-General, apart from the late Harvey Barnett's Tale of the Scorpion; (2) and it is a very different work, in that Judge Woodward's book only deals in part with his time as Director-General of A.S.I.O.

Ted Woodward was appointed head of A.S.I.O. by the Whitlam Government, but only took up his position after the 1975 Whitlam dismissal and the election of Malcolm Fraser. Peter Barbour, A.S.I.O.'s third Director-General, had been dismissed by P.M. Whitlam on grounds of inefficiency, coloured by a great deal of unsavory rumour, which are best left unmentioned for the sake of the late Mr. Barbour's family.

The interim Director-General, Frank Mahony, detached from the Prime Minister's Department, was probably the best head the organisation never had, although he thoroughly deserves to be on the roll of A.S.I.O.'s chiefs. He was a decent, honest man with a keen nose for bull-dust and flattery, both of which he appeared to despise. In personal dealings, he was amiable and courteous. His presence raised morale from a very low ebb, emanating from the 1973 Murphy raid and exacerbated by the demise of Peter Barbour. And so we come to Judge Woodward.

Standing back from the fray, the question must be asked whether it is possible to deliver an impartial assessment of the man and his actions as Director-General. The answer probably depends upon one's distance from the locus of power.

Judge Woodward entered A.S.I.O., with the former head of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (A.S.I.S.), Harvey Barnett, as his Deputy Director-General. Despite mutterings about accepting the "poisoned chalice", on paper and inside the organisation it appeared to be a very safe choice. Judge Woodward was the Director-General in whom executive power resided, while Barnett was very much in charge of operational matters.

This was very much the first reforming regime after Brigadier Sir Charles Spry and Peter Barbour who, respectively, had run A.S.I.O. virtually as personal fiefdoms, although Barbour had made some fumbling attempts at reform. In sociological terms, using Max Weber's organisational theories, Sir Charles Spry was very much the dynamic and charismatic military-style leader. There were few rules set down on paper and quite frequent arbitrary decision-making at the top; precedent counted f0r little. It was probably a style of leadership that was relevant to the first generation of A.S.I.O. officers, most of whom had served in the armed forces during World War II, and many of whom were genuine but unpublicised heroes. Sir Charles had a set-piece lecture to newcomers: A.S.I.O. was the "fourth arm of defence" and, if hostilities broke out, all officers would be in army uniform the next day. The rank system was based on an armed forces comparator.

Barbour tried to follow, but as usual there was a classic Weberian second-generation crisis. Never had a Director-General taken over with such human capital of goodwill, but it evaporated in record time--about three months--owing to a variety of factors not discussed here. Frank Mahony held the ship basically as a steady hand on the wheel, and the new team was the first to attempt what Weber refers to as legal-rational principles. Bearing in mind that, for Weber, bureaucracy was the most efficient and effective type of organisation, the Woodward-Barnett regime made a demonstrable amount of progress.

This can be contrasted with Harvey Barnett's successor, Alan K. Wrigley, a former Secretary of the Defence Department, who instituted draconian reforms that tried to reduce specialisation and increased generalisation, continuing a trend that had begun under Judge Woodward. The latter, at least, recognised that A.S.I.O. officers were not run-of-the-mill public servants and that specialisation had a great deal of merit, provided it was not carried to excess. Wrigley's excesses and A.S.I.O.'s move from Melbourne to Canberra in 1986 cost the Organisation dearly in terms of experience and knowledge, as the best officers left once he reneged on reasonably favourable transfer conditions negotiated with the Hawke Government by Harvey Barnett.

Another new addition to the team was Philip McBride, who had been one of Justice Robert M. Hope's assistants in the first Royal Commission into Intelligence and Security, conducted over about 18 months during 1975-6. McBride's role was to turn around what amounted to an administration lacking consistency and wracked by nepotism, favouritism and probable unethical behaviour. His efforts were to drag A.S.I.O. into line with the Australian Public Service general rules and to establish a logical structure, to ensure promotion by merit and generally to keep the distance between A.S.I.O. and the A.P.S., as it should be. A.S.I.O. is an intelligence organisation which requires a high degree of secrecy and a minimum of bureaucracy and probably, above all, it should be leak-proof. It is not intended to pass judgment on McBride's performance in this paper, except to say that promotions and appointments were certainly fairer but not without manipulation. He also presided over the formation of a Staff Association for airing grievances. It was a pretty tame trade union, but according to some had its uses, while others cynically regarded it as a tool of management.

From the outset, Woodward and Barnett made it abundantly clear that serving A.S.I.O. officers were essentially a pack of outlaws or criminals who had previously operated outside the law. The effect such a statement had on serving staff was demoralising and often resulted in angry statements in general office chit-chat. However, at a Headquarters meeting attended by all staff, and at subsequent mini-meetings in Regional (State) offices, officers were told that a line had been drawn underneath their personal history and performance: they were recommencing at a new Year One. The staff were told that, in discussions with government, abolition of A.S.I.O. and its replacement by a new organisation had been a concrete proposition; and that, after lengthy consideration with government, it had been decided to crack down on A.S.I.O. and bring it into line. There was never any way of corroborating these statements. In retrospect, disbanding the Organisation and commencing again with selected, re-vetted staff may have been a better option.

It was also noticeable that, at times of stress for the upper echelon, the rank and file were regularly reminded of their previous indiscretions and the potential for their redeployment elsewhere. Those who joined the Organisation after the commencement of the new regime tended to be regarded as the "chosen" or the pure--an analogue of the K.G.B.'s so-called "golden youth". Mostly graduates, they were given intensive training and placed on a merry-go-round of postings designed to smash specialisation in favour of generalisation. The author of that idea is not known, but whoever it was should have known that intelligence is a craft, not a science or art, and that it depends not only on the body of ac cumulated written or taped material, but on analysis by staff with a good knowledge of the various fields--counter-espionage, counter-subversion, counter-intelligence and counterterrorism. Expertise is needed in these sub-disciplines at field or operational level as well as a sound...