GGW18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

• Jurisdiction: Australia Federal only
• Court: Federal Court (Australia)
• Judgment Date: 24 August 2026
• Neutral Citation: [2026] FCA 1198
• Date: 24 August 2026

Federal Court of Australia

GGW18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2026] FCA 1198

ORDERS

VID 1143 of 2024
BETWEEN:	GGW18 Appellant
AND:	MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS First Respondent ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL Second Respondent

order made by:	BUTTON J
DATE OF ORDER:	24 August 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BUTTON J:

1 This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) (FCFCoA): GGW18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 970 (J). The primary judge dismissed the Appellant’s application for judicial review. The judicial review application was made in respect of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirming a decision of a delegate of the First Respondent (the Minister) to refuse to grant the Appellant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Tribunal gave written reasons for its decision (T).

2 The Appellant is a citizen of Malaysia. She arrived in Australia on a tourist visa, and later applied for a protection visa. Her claim to protection was founded on a claim that she had taken out a loan from a Malaysian loan shark while she was in Malaysia, had paid off some, but not all, of her debt to the loan shark and faced harm from the loan shark if she returned to Malaysia.

3 The Tribunal rejected the Appellant’s claims. The Tribunal found that the Appellant “fabricated” the claims before it, and “manufactured her claims in order to remain in Australia”: T [84]–[85]. The Tribunal concluded expressly that it “[did] not accept that the [Appellant] borrowed money from loan sharks”: T [86]. The Tribunal recounted in its reasons its engagement with the Appellant during the hearing before it regarding her claims. The Tribunal set out in detail why it rejected the Appellant’s claims.

4 The judicial review application before the primary judge was made without any properly formulated grounds of review having been put forward. The primary judge’s reasons detail her open questioning of the Appellant as to the Appellant’s complaints about the Tribunal’s processes and decision. Having undertaken that process, the primary judge observed that the Appellant failed before the Tribunal because her claim for protection was not accepted on the facts: J [49]. The primary judge then identified the principles governing when adverse credibility findings may be susceptible to review for jurisdictional error, and applied those principles to the Tribunal’s adverse credit findings in its decision: J [50]ff. The primary judge concluded the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error in its credibility findings: J [52].

5 The grounds of appeal, as stated by the Appellant in her Notice of Appeal in this Court, are as follows (emphasis added, otherwise quoted as per original):

1. I, [name], the applicant in the above mentioned matter, hereby give notice of my intention to appeal against the decision rendered by Judge Cuthbertson on 2 October 2024 in the case of GGW18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024].

2. I am appealing the decision on the grounds of jurisdictional error. The Tribunal failed to properly consider the specific circumstances of my case, leading to an erroneous decision. The Tribunal's findings were based on an incomplete understanding of the facts and did not take into account critical information that would have affected the outcome of the case.

3. The Tribunal's decision that was conducted on 15 February 2018 does not take into account the interest rate imposed by the loan shark on the loan that I took; instead, it made a basic calculation that the outstanding amount of RM6000 is equivalent to approximately $2000 dollar Australia. In many cases, loan sharks impose interest rates that are far above legal limits, leading to a cycle of debt that is difficult to escape. By only considering the principal amount and converting it to its equivalent in Australian dollars without factoring the interest accrued, the tribunal may not be reflecting the true financial burden that I am facing.

4. The Tribunal's decision to focus solely on principal amount without factoring in the interest rates may overlook the true financial burden on me as the borrower. The Tribunal's decision appears to overlook the significant impact of predatory lending practices, particularly the exorbitant interest rates often charged by loan sharks. These rates can drastically inflate the amount I owed over the years, making it much more difficult for me to repay the debt. Hence, I believe I should be given another chance of hearing so that I can provide proof by video calling my mom and younger sister in Malaysia.

5. Furthermore, I wish to provide new information that was not previously disclosed during the proceedings with the Tribunal. I would like to bring to the Court's attention that I am a muslim woman from Malaysia and that I am in a same-sex reltionship.

6. In Malaysia, same-sex relationships are deemed unacceptable, particularly within the context of my religious beliefs (which I was born into and have no freedom to choose my religion) and societal norms.

7. I believe that this new information is essential to understanding the complexities of my situation and how it directly impacts my safety and well-being if I were to return to Malaysia.

8. I failed to address this critical aspect of my identity was because the interpreter who was in the proceedings with the Tribunal is someone who is an acquaintance. He is close with one of my friends and from what I have been told is that I need to be aware of because the interpreter are casually talks to his friends about anybody that he knows in the hearing's room and will discuss the issue openly which made me afraid to disclose my identity as a lesbian.

6 The parties were advised of the date and time for the hearing of the appeal on 1 June 2026. At the start of the hearing, the Appellant made an (unforeshadowed) oral application for an adjournment of the hearing. I heard from the parties on the adjournment application and refused the adjournment. Reasons were given on the transcript.

7 The only other procedural matter to note is that the Appellant did not file any written submissions in accordance with the timetable set by orders of the Court. When invited to make her submissions during the hearing, the Appellant sought to rely on a two-page written submission. I stood the matter down to allow the Minister time to read the document. The Minister did not oppose the Court receiving the late written submissions.

8 The Appellant did not make any oral submissions of substance over and above the contents of her written submissions and grounds set out in her Notice of Appeal.

9 As is apparent from the grounds, it appears that the Appellant contends that the Tribunal did not take account of “critical information”, that being the interest rate imposed by the loan shark, and the resulting financial burden on the Appellant, as well as matters concerning the Appellant’s sexuality. The eighth ground advances an explanation for why the Appellant did not raise matters concerning her sexuality before the Tribunal.

10 Before the Tribunal, the Appellant did not raise the imposition of interest by the loan shark on the loan, and the impact of the imposition of interest on the financial burden that the Appellant would face in trying to pay off the loan. Nor was the matter of interest and the associated scale of the financial burden raised by the Appellant before the primary judge. That being the case, the Appellant needs leave to raise, on this appeal, a point not taken below.

11 The matter of the Appellant’s sexuality was also not raised before the Tribunal, although it was raised by the Appellant before the primary judge, as I will detail below.

12 The Appellant’s written submissions are silent on the interest issue; indeed, the submissions say nothing about the loan shark claims at all. Nevertheless, I will proceed on the basis that the grounds of appeal relating to interest on the loan shark loan have not been abandoned.

13 Leave to raise grounds of appeal 3 and 4 concerning interest on the loan will be refused. As the Minister noted in his submissions, leave may be granted if a ground not raised below has merit, there is no real prejudice to the respondent and there is an adequate explanation for the failure to take the point below: see VUAX v Minister for Immigration...