How will Japan's defence change its future?

• Author: Shuja, Sharif
• Position: 134672597
• Pages: 54(9)

Japan has long centred its foreign policy on its bilateral relationship with the United States, a stance supported by the majority of the Japanese. This relationship took its present shape during the decades of the Cold War, and discussions of it within Japan are still based largely on perceptions rooted in the structures of that era. This is, of course, due in part to the peculiarities of the situation in Asia, including the continued existence of communist governments in China and North Korea. However, there have been some changes. (1)

Japan is important in U.S. defence calculations. (2) Japan-U.S. cooperation has become an integral part of the global security framework with the United States at its core, and the bilateral ties have grown accordingly. The United States will continue to figure importantly in Japan's defence and security policies. The general feeling is that Japan would like to have even closer relations with Washington, which could help to "guarantee Japan's security". (3)

Two schools of thought on America have existed in Japan's decision-making circles. These are (1) the Realist school of thought; and (2) the Liberalist school of thought.

Those belonging to the Realist school of thought view America as being guarantor of Japan's security, and adopt a pro-American stance. These people lack the vision that would allow them to respond effectively to the changes taking place on a global scale. Their position tends to focus primarily on specific circumstances in East Asia and pays little heed to America's global strategic thinking; the Realist view also puts insufficient weight on recent trends toward alliances based on shared values, particularly human rights and humanitarianism, which are increasingly underpinning responses to regional conflicts. The Realist school does not fully comprehend that alliances in the post-Cold War era are increasingly based on the presumption that they are justified by certain ideals.

Liberalist thinkers in Japan seek to establish that the end of the Cold War should mean the end of the use of military force. They tend to criticise American involvement in any conflict as a bid for military supremacy, thus feeding the persistent undercurrent of sentiment against the United States among the Japanese people. This sentiment could be described as a kind of antipathy toward absolute power rather than simple anti-Americanism--a sentiment seen not just in Japan but also in France and other European countries. It is a feeling that has grown in reaction to the increasingly interventionist approach the United States has taken in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.

Japanese strategic thinking, like that of many European countries, generally sees threats in traditional terms, based upon perceived intentions of other actors, mainly states, with containment and deterrence as the main instruments to ensure national security. American neo-conservatives, however, see security in terms of the possible capabilities of others, requiring pre-emption and regime change to prevent future threats emerging.

Under Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, Japan has been an enthusiastic supporter of the U.S.-led war on terrorism, with Japanese combat personnel being despatched overseas for the first time without U.N. authorisation. Moreover, after years of prevaricating, Japan has also signed up to the United States global system of missile defence. Certainly, U.S. pressure had a great deal to do with both decisions, but perhaps more importantly, the rhetoric of the Bush doctrine offered Prime Minister Koizumi a chance to further his nationalist agenda.

The main issue for Japan's foreign policy now is how to make international contributions that respond to the needs of global society while maintaining the alliance with the United States as the centerpiece. These contributions include military efforts, such as Japan's participation in peacekeeping operations, and non-military assistance in economic and technical fields.

NEW INITIATIVES

On 6 June 2003, Japan's Parliament passed three war contingency bills. These were the Law regarding Response to Armed Attacks, the Law on the Establishment of the Security Council of Japan, and the Law to amend the Self-Defence Force (S.D.F.). These bills increased the government's powers in military emergencies. Under the contingency laws, the government will draft a plan of action when there is an attack against Japan or when the government determines that the danger of an attack is imminent. The plan, following the Cabinet approval, must be endorsed by the Diet. In situations deemed particularly urgent, the government is empowered to mobilise the S.D.F. before drawing up a plan, but has to halt the deployment of forces if the eventual plan is rejected by the Diet. The law also allows the government to put the S.D.F. on standby when it determines that a military attack is "anticipated". The amendment to the S.D.F. law enables military personnel to seize land and other property for operations...