Iran and deception modalities: the reach of taqiyya, kitman, khod'eh and taarof.

• Author: Campbell, Andrew
• Position: 155873239
• Pages: 25(24)

This article continues the study and implications of the critical role of Iranian deception modalities (1) in Iranian-Shi'ite political discourse, especially in relation to the 20-year clandestine development of Iran's nuclear programme.

Taqiyya (religiously-sanctioned deception or dissimulation to conceal one's true intentions and beliefs), kitman (deception) and khod'eh (trickery or claiming one's true position by half-truths rather than outright lies or deception) are deception techniques inherent in Iranian statecraft and nuclear negotiations with the Europeans and the United States.

Taarof is a form of deception through diversion of meaning from the subject or issue under discussion, which may be playful in some Iranian domestic contexts, but in the context of nuclear discussions may have serious implications. (2)

TAAROF: DIVERSION AND AMBIGUITY OF RESPONSE

Concerning taarof, Nasser Hadian, a Tehran-based political scientist, says: "You have to guess if people are sincere, you are never sure." (3) Kian Tajbakhsh, a Tehran-based social scientist, notes: (4)

"Speech has a different function [in Iran] than it does in the West. In the West, 80 percent of language is denotative. In Iran 80 percent is connotative.... In the West, 'yes' generally means yes. In Iran, 'yes' can mean yes, but it often means maybe or no.... It makes for bad political discourse. In political discourse people don't know what to trust." Iranians claim that foreign invasions have taught the them "the value of hiding their true face". (5) Fatima Farideh Nejat, a prominent and original researcher on taarof notes: "The locution of exchanges of taarof can change depending on who offers taarof and whether the offer is sincere (samimaneh) or deceitful (chaploosaneh), even manipulative." (6) Muhammad Sanati, an Iranian social psychologist, notes: "When you tell lies, it can save your life. Then you can see the problem of language in this country." (7)

Western diplomats claim that taarof offers Iranian negotiators an advantage when dealing with more studied and formal skills of other countries. Iranians are used to concealing their feelings and are unsure in dealing with each other and especially non-Iranians. This forms the basis of their attachments to deception.

Taarof--also known as indirection or expediency--affects public and political discourse, but it is a deception modality in the skilled hands of Iranian negotiators. In Iran, taarof is also a knowingly false promise based on a false premise. The matter may be trivial and in relation to everyday patterns of incivility or "irony" or even extend to humorous participation if taarof becomes a game. Failure of a politician to deliver a campaign promise is regarded as taarof and not as a lie. Taarof has been compared to a verbal dance between a giver and recipient until one defers to settle the matter and, as such, is a "language game" commonly used for negotiations to gain advantage.

AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI: THE POWER OF KHOD'EH (TRICKERY AND DECEIT)

The deception technique khod'eh, used by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to overthrow Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, in 1979, demonstrates the centrality and continuity of deception in Iranian history. Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, was steeped in khod'eh traditions. Taheri points out: (8)

"During his stay at Neauphle-le-Chateau, Khomeini used all the traditional techniques of Shi'ite leadership. These included khod'eh, which means tricking an enemy into a misjudgement of one's true position. Khomeini did not tell direct lies but used many half-truths based on well established khod'eh tactics. Later, in 1984, he admitted to having used khod'eh in order to trick the enemies of Islam ... "Khomeini actively encouraged such illusions in accordance with another Shi'ite tactic, that of tanfih, which means weakening the positions of potential rivals or enemies. Khod'eh, taqiyya and tanfih were also used along with kitman (dissimulation) in opening negotiations with the Americans. On the basis of khod'eh, the Ayatollah never even announced the word 'Republic' until after he won power." Khomeini used taqiyya for impression-management for Western audiences to support his "united front" campaign against the Shah, including even the operational assets of the Moscow-controlled Tudeh (Communist) Party to overthrow the Shah's regime. After gaining power, he approved the physical elimination of many of his former supporters. (9)

Khomeini's mastery of taqiyya and khod'eh was most evident in the years prior to the overthrow of the Shah. From his residence, rented for him by exiled supporters in France in the village of Neauphle-le-Chateau, he described the United States as the "Great Satan" in hundreds of thousands of underground cassettes, pamphlets and speeches which were distributed by returning pilgrims who had visited Khomeini and through clandestine channels of the pro-Moscow Tudeh Party in Iran. (10)

During his four months' residence in Paris, Khomeini gave 132 radio interviews, television and press interviews and issued 50 declarations which were later published in Iran. Direct contact with Iran was established and two telephone lines and telexes were quickly established. Khomeini was in nearly hourly contact with his field commander in Iran, Ayatollah Morteza Motahari.

According to Taheri's account, "Khomeini kept quiet about his radical views on social and legal issues; he put himself forward as a moderate man", emphasising that the new regime would not change Iran's social structure. He also reassured Western concerns that an Islamic government would not threaten oil supplies. Taheri summarises: "For example, he promised female equality and full press freedom which were, however, qualified with phrases such as 'in accordance with Islam' or 'on the basis of the Koran'." (11)

Khomeini did not publicly discuss his plan to establish the velayat-e-faghih (the principle of theocratic rule or the rule of the jurist) prior to the revolution of 1979. As Khomeini later told Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr: "In Paris, I found it expedient to say certain things. In Iran, I find it expedient to refute what I said, and I do so unreservedly." (12)

According to a prominent Iranian political activist, Ayatollah Sahabi: "... Ayatollah Khomeini did not view it advisable to raise the question of velayat-e-faghih at that point during the course of the revolution." During his stay in Paris, Khomeini's entourage restricted his slogans to "independence, freedom and Islamic government". Khomeini told his entourage "to change the slogan to the Islamic Republic, because Islamic government had a certain context and form that were not advisable then". (13)

In 1999, Ezatollah Sahabi, a close colleague of the Ayatollah in Paris, recalled him crossing out the words "Islamic government" from a text submitted to him and writing "Islamic Republic". (14)

Khomeini's aides dialled directly to Tehran to spread his revolutionary message and he read his sermons into cassette tapes. William Shawcross points out: (15)

"His [Khomeini's] pronouncements were published and broadcast almost daily, and his young, Western-educated aides acted as brilliant propagandists. The BBC, in particular, gave full coverage to his views. By the end of 1978, the ayatollah had come to be seen, by many of these Western intellectuals interested in Iran, as a saintly old man who was determined to establish a far more just, democratic, and 'spiritual' regime than that run by the cruel, corrupt, and despotic Shah." Shawcross also noted: (16)

"Khomeini had been able brilliantly to dissemble his true ambitions, beneath lofty, almost Delphic generalizations. By suggesting that he shared everyone's hopes and beliefs, he had managed to form the broadest possible coalition." Taheri concludes: (17)

"Khomeini encouraged the fostering of democratic illusions from his supporters in accordance with the Shia tactic of tanfih--taking the sting out of one's potential enemies--and the tactic of taqiyya-which means misleading everyone about one's true beliefs." On returning to Iran, the victorious Khomeini, on 19 August 1979, in a special message to the Assembly for the final preparation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, discussed the centrality of the rule of the jurist or theocracy (concerning which he had written as early as 1970 in his work Islamic Government): (18)

"[T]he constitution and other laws in this republic must be one hundred percent based on Islam.... Islamic theologians present in this assembly must clearly express their view if they see an article in the draft of the constitution or a suggestion that deviates from Islam. They must not be afraid of the brawl by gharbzadeh-ha (those under influence of Western culture) writers and journalists." Significantly, few had studied Khomeini's Islamic Government, although he ordered a new translation for publication in Iran. (19) A noted professor of Middle East studies who read Khomeini's defence of Islamic government and the "rule of the jurist", or theocratic rule, warned the CIA and forwarded translated passages of the book to CIA Headquarters, but the CIA could not confirm the author of the book, although the U.S. Congressional Library had the text. In late 1978, the CIA finally funded a translation of the book, from the Arabic edition. (20)

As Taheri notes: "The fact that few of the middle class and leftist leaders who sided with Khomeini took time to read his books ... was to cost them dearly. Many paid for that omission with their lives." (21)

PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD: CONTINUING KHOMEINI'S POLICIES

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad regards himself as continuing Khomeini's mission of winning the clash of civilisations between Islam, as represented by Iran, and the West, particularly the United States and Israel.

In 1997, 1,000 copies of a pirated translation of Samuel P. Huntington's celebrated book The Clash of...