Liberating intelligence from suffocating bureaucracy.

• Author: Reed, Warren
• Pages: 37(17)

DEFINING THE THREAT

Australia's newly-elected Labor Government faces a major dilemma with national security. Ever since the United States opted for a Homeland Security Department in the aftermath of the horrors of September 11, 2001, the idea of Australia adding an extra layer of bureaucracy in its fight against terror has been canvassed on a regular basis.

Perhaps responding to opinion polls, which consistently showed the former Coalition Government trusted more on matters of national security, the Labor Party, in the lead-up to the 2007 federal election, formally proposed the establishment of such a department. (1)

While not necessarily disagreeing with the fundamentals of a new homeland security structure, this article will argue that more bureaucracy is not what's needed. Far from it!

We also intend to be non-partisan, as unity is a very important concern. To argue that the ALP is in some way "soft" on terrorism is to ignore statements made regularly by Arch Bevis, when he was Labor spokesman on national security. Last year, he quoted a statement he made back in 1998: (2)

"Terrorism, in its various forms, must now be included as an integral fact in our future security planning. To effectively combat these threats requires a coordinated effort across traditional government structures... "Terrorists have proven extremely adaptable and versatile.Government agencies and big businesses are not renowned for the same agility. If we are not careful, we will find ourselves planning to fight the last battle instead of the next." That hardly sounds like being soft on terrorism, and we have not observed any resiling from this view. The fact remains that the major parties are in broad agreement on terrorism and counter-terrorism. The differences are minimal but quite important.

Australia's current intelligence system is already overburdened by bureaucracy, to the extent that it is rapidly becoming sclerotic and increasingly unworkable. It needs to be freed from the constraints of bureaucracy, nepotism and cronyism, and allowed to operate more professionally, with a charter of truth and accountability that is more effectively sanitised from the transitory priorities of politicians. Intelligence deals with long-term and ongoing problems; the three-year electoral cycle effectively defeats that trend.

Some might think that's a big ask, but the business of protecting the well-being of the nation requires sharp focus and devotion. Like the old saying about not being half-pregnant, it is not something that can be or should be tackled half-heartedly.

Consider the challenge and you'll see why: Islamist terrorists aim for results, and by the quickest and most effective means. They're not preoccupied with the compartmentalisation and stultification that bureaucracy brings. They set a goal and stick to it doggedly, maximising their energy flows and resilience. Their only accountability is to Allah. Those who choose to be human bombs are assured of a reward in heaven. (3) As an American writer recently asked: "How do we fight an enemy who loves death?" (4) He found an answer with an Afghan jihadist, Maulana Inyadullah, who put it succinctly and clearly: "We are not afraid of death. The Americans love Pepsi Cola, we love death.... We fought for the cause of Islam, because Allah commanded us. We embraced death, we were willing to be martyrs."

That is the mentality with which our country and intelligence bodies have to contend.

We should be in no doubt about the lethal intent we face. Al Qaeda formally declared war on the United States in 1996 (some experts consider it to be a decade earlier), and that terror war quickly became an artefact of the contradictions between Islamic fundamentalism on the one hand, and globalising, liberal-democratic Western societies on the other. (5) Following some spectacular attacks on the Americans in East Africa, the World Trade Center twin-towers in New York became a prime target in 1993. By placing an explosives-laden van in the basement of one building, the aim was to bring that tower down on the other. It very nearly worked. Soon after, the Bojinka Plan was uncovered in Manila, whereby Al Qaeda was revealed as plotting to hijack a dozen airliners over the Pacific and to plunge them into iconic buildings.

The writing was on the wall for the American and allied intelligence system, which had been cut back after the end of the Cold War by governments demanding a "peace dividend". Yet just over eight years after the first 1993 strike on the World Trade Center, a second attack on the towers proved a stunning and tragic success. The rest is history, whether it was the train blasts in Madrid (11 March 2004), the attacks on London's underground railway (7 July 2005), or the outsourced Bali and Mumbai bombings.

None of the movements involved, whether Al Qaeda Central or "homegrown" versions of the franchise, were obsessed with bureaucracy. Meanwhile, our system in Australia trundled on with swathes of bureaucratic patches and bandages applied in haste. No thought was given to what we could learn from an experiment that had taken place on Australian soil that led to what was very nearly the greatest weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack in modern history. That was the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect's plan to devastate Tokyo, a conurbation of 40 million, with sarin nerve-gas dispersed from helicopters in just the right meteorological conditions. Millions would no doubt have been killed.

But there was a problem with the helicopters, so it was decided to run a limited test in the Tokyo subway on 20 March 1995. That left 12 people dead and another 50 injured.

The point is that the sect had purchased, through a front company, a sheep farm in Western Australia, north-east of Perth, where experiments were carried out in 1993-94. Chemicals and a variety of equipment were brought in on commercial flights, which attracted the attention of Australian police and customs officials. There was a $20,000 excess baggage bill for a start, plus a fine for some of the chemical agents that should not have been loaded onto an aircraft.

No alarm bells rang inside Australia's intelligence system, at least not until the deaths in the Tokyo subway. Even then, nothing seemed to be learnt from what had happened on our soil. For us, what Aum Shinrikyo had pulled off should have been identified as a dry run for a terrorist attack, practised in this country. It should also have alerted us to dangers closer to home, such as Jemaah Ismaliyah in Indonesia, which we similarly missed.

The reality is that our intelligence system needs a complete overhaul, not only in structure but also in attitude. Rather than another bureaucratic layer, it needs more integration, more flexibility and more managers with a proven track-record in intelligence work. Sir Richard Dearlove, former chief of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and a professional line officer who handed over to a fellow professional in early 2006, articulated this well in a paper published by the Singapore-based Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS). He first noted that intelligence-collection in the past "has been designed to confront other intelligence organisations, or to collect intelligence against organisations that have similar hierarchical structures". (6) He then noted that: (7)

"Integration of intelligence and operational information must occur as soon as possible and at the lowest levels which are closest to the 'front lines'. Centralisation and central bureaucracies impede operational effectiveness, especially in the areas of timeliness and their ability to discern the relative importance of the 'fine grains' of intelligence data. "Front line intelligence personnel and investigators, together with mid-level front line managers, are in the best position to assess the potential impact, validity and required responses. They need to be gathered together in small groups that can work laterally and not in large central bureaucracies. "The environment in which this is done needs to be one that is creative rather than one formulated by a centralised bureaucracy." In this sort of system it would be more likely that we could detect dangers inside our own community, wherever they reside. At around 350,000, Australia's Muslim population is comparable on a per capita basis to similar communities in the US and UK. While the overwhelming majority have come here seeking a better life, it is the minority with ill intent that we have to uncover. Unofficial estimates have put a figure on that minority of 2,000 individuals, which, if correct, places an enormous strain on intelligence resources. (8)

Tanveer Ahmed, an Australian Muslim writer and psychiatry registrar, put it this way in 2006: (9)

"Surveys in London's Daily Telegraph in February found 6 per cent of Muslims believed the London bombings were justified. This equates to about 100,000 people in Britain who could see nothing wrong with the July 7 attacks in their country. Almost 35 per cent were sympathetic. While no similar surveys...