The Montara Oil Spill and the Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan: Disaster Response or Just a Disaster?

• Author: Tina Hunter
• Position: BA (Hons); G Dip A (LIS); M App Sc (LIM) (Dist); JD (Hons); PhD, University of Bergen, Norway. Assistant Professor, Bond University, Gold Coast, Australia. Gjesteforsker, Universitetet i Bergen, Norway
• Pages: 46-58

THE MONTARA OIL SPILL AND THE NATIONAL MARINE OIL SPILL

CONTINGENCY PLAN: DISASTER RESPONSE OR JUST A DISASTER?

Tina Hunte r*

This study analyses the adequacy of the Australian Offshore Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan in responding to

petroleum platform-sourced oil spills, in light of the Montara Oil Spill in the Timor Sea in August 2009. After a

consideration of the causes of the Montara Oil Spill, this study outlines the regulatory and response framework for

marine oil spills in Australia, outlining the three pillars of oil spill planning, namely preparedness, training and

response. The study then analyses the adequacy of the NatPlan and the National Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan

to address petroleum platform-sourced oil spills. This analysis highlights the weaknesses in oil spill preparedness,

training and response to oil spills from oil installation-sourced oil pollution. In addition, it highlights the discord

between the aim of the oil company to cap the leak, and the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority to

preserve life through the implementation of a ‘no go’ zone around the Montara platform. In responding to the

weaknesses identified in this critical analysis, this study also offers possible changes to Australia’s oil spill response

strategy to ensure that the response to future petroleum platform-sourced oil spills are best practice.

1. Introduction

The Montara oil spill in August 2009 was the first major marine oil spill from an offshore petroleum platform, with

all other major oil spills in Australia the result of ship-sourced pollution.1

Soon after the uncontrolled release of

hydrocarbons (the oil spill) from the Montara Well Head Platform, PTTEP as the responsible Combat Agency,

handed over control of the spill to the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), in accordance with

Australia’s National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil and Other Noxious and Hazardous Substances

(NatPlan), and the associated National Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan (NMOSCP). The spill constituted a major

disaster in terms of oil spills in Australia, triggering a Tier Three response to the spill under the NatPlan.

Since the oil spill, there has been a government inquiry into the causes of the spill. Whilst this study necessarily

considers the causes of the Montara oil spill for the purposes of completeness, it does not does not seek to analyse

these causes and the legal issues arising out of the incident. Furthermore, this study does not seek to provide a

detailed analysis of the adequacy of the AMSA response, as delegated Combat Agency, to the oil spill.2

Rather, this

study examines the adequacy of the NatPlan in responding to Australia’s first major platform-sourced marine oil

spill. In doing so, it will firstly outline the cause of the Montara oil spill. It then outlines the regulatory framework

of the NatPlan and NMOSCP in relation to marine oil spills. In doing so, it considers the three pillars of oil spill

planning in Australian waters, namely preparedness, training and response. Finally, it analyses the response to the

Montara oil spill under the NMOSCP, and the adequacy of the NMOSCP to respond to a major oil spill from a

remote oil platform. It critically examines whether the preparedness and response by the platform operator PTTEP

(as initial Combat Agency), as outlined in the NatPlan, was adequate to manage the severity of the spill, and whether

the NatPlan and NMOSCP were an adequate regulatory tool for a petroleum platform-sourced oil spill. This

analysis necessarily encompasses an assessment of actions of the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority

(NOPSA) in the management of the oil spill. Where limitations in the adequacy of the NMOSCP to oil platform

spills have been identified, this study provides a discussion on possible solutions to these limitations.

* BA (Hons); G Dip A (LIS); M App Sc (LIM) (Dist); JD (Hons); PhD, University of Bergen, Norway.

Assistant Professor, Bond University, Gold Coast, Australia. Gjesteforsker, Universitetet i Bergen, Norway.

1 For details of all major oil spills in Australia’s waters in the last thirty years, refer to Australian Maritime Safety Authority, Major Oil Spills in

Australia (2009) <http://www.amsa.gov.au/Marine_Environment_Protection/Major_Oil_Spills_in_Australia/> at 21 April 2010.

2 An analysis of the role of AMSA has been undertaken by AMSA in its report Australian Maritime Safety Authority, Response to the Montara

Wellhead Platform Incident: Report of the Incident Analysis Team March 2010 (2010).

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