The abuses of realism and Australian security interests.

• Jurisdiction: Australia
• Author: Tanter, Richard
• Date: 22 March 2007

The 2007 Defence Update

The Defence Update 2007 (1) comes after a decade of constant and still unfinished increases in defence spending, a tripling of domestic security spending, huge weapons systems orders, Australian Defence Force deployments from Lebanon to the Solomon Islands, three large and extremely demanding deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan and East Timor, and at a time when world politics is turning on the hinge of a massive strategic miscalculation by Australia's closest ally. The Update is a deeply flawed policy document, shaped by double standards and selective learning, shortsightedness and botched use of realism, the aggressive demands of alliance maintenance, and an almost complete failure to consider the real and salient threats to Australian security--both the state and human versions--of global problems such as climate change, health and poverty.

The Jargon of National Interests

The Update follows its 2003 and 2005 predecessors, (2) which reflect changes in the policy and strategic environment since the 2000 Defence White Paper. (3) The purpose of the Update and the rationale for its preparation are clearly explained:

the Government has carefully assessed our national interests and how we might best use our armed forces in pursuit of those interests. The core stated goal of defence policy is the pursuit of Australia's 'national interests'. Indeed, in the brief space of sixty-four pages of generously spaced text and photographs, the word 'interests' appears forty-two times. The interests concerned are Australia's, as in 'Australian national interests' or, very occasionally, those of Australia's allies. No other conceptual term appears so often nor is used so freely and with so little definition or conceptual traction.

There is, of course, a long history of concern about the whole idea of national interests as a guide to policy, which at the very least includes such questions as: How do we know what the national interest is? Who decides what the national interest is (beyond the claims of a government)? How is 'the nation' defined? How are moral concerns and interests derived from the requirements of power politics to be reconciled? And, how are the global human interest and the moral obligations of our shared humanity to be addressed within a national framework of democratic politics?

None of these questions is addressed in the Update, and it is unreasonable to expect Defence planners to be preoccupied with questions of political philosophy. However, none of these questions is irrelevant to our current security concerns, and some, especially those driven by global concerns, are highly salient. It is therefore reasonable to expect some reflection of them in policy.

The lack of clarity and traction in the use of 'interests' in this document as a guide to policy comes from at least three immediately salient sources visible in the Update: double standards and selective learning; shortsightedness and a botched use of 'realism'; and the demands of alliance maintenance.

Double Standards and Selective Learning

To speak of double standards in security affairs is to immediately invite suspicion that you are not serious about policy. The world of international politics, it is argued, is the realm of power, and policy formation for the national interest is a matter of seeking purchase in an anarchic world. In polite circles, we all understand that our friends and allies have failings best not mentioned. At worst, international politics is unfortunately the realm of 'reasons of state'--as Bakunin rightly remarked and Chomsky reminds us, the most frightening term in our political lexicon.

The unwritten 'product warning' that comes with White Papers and their like cues readers to accept such double standards, and to pass over them in sophisticated silence. Yet, while consistency is certainly an overrated political virtue, there are some limits to the value of a blind-eye in global politics. This is especially so when there are signs that those in power can no longer distinguish between the little lies that make close company possible, and violent, genuinely threatening reality. Moreover, as even the Update concedes, we do live in a world where elements of moral community exist beyond the nation-state, and have a call on national policy. The capacity to execute policy in a democracy effectively is weakened by the combination of too facile a blind-eye in the face of genuinely threatening real developments, and by the corrosive effects on legitimacy (a key element of 'soft power') of knowing an obvious partiality masquerading as the application of universal values. Both factors are evident in the double standards and selective learning that undermine the interpretation of Australian interests offered in the Update as the...