The United States and India.

• Author: Shuja, Sharif
• Position: 151441497
• Pages: 35(11)

When U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited India in March last year, she said: "This is my first step as Secretary of State in Asia. The President has personally put a lot of time and energy into the relationship. The U.S. has determined that this is going to be a very important relationship going forward and we are going to put whatever time we need into it." The aim was to take U.S.-India ties "to another level". According to her, the Bush Administration was sworn to assisting "India become a major world power in the twenty-first century".

Rarely in the past hundred years has a U.S. president sent a signal of this dimension. It means that the U.S. will help India realise the global aspiration that its size, geography and its post- 1991 economic reform agenda have made into a national obsession. The core judgement is that a strong, democratic and influential India is an asset for the U.S. in the region and the world.

At the annual Asia Security Summit, known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, in Singapore on 3 June, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said: "Our relationship with India has grown from an uneasy coexistence during the Cold War to a true partnership, based on our common values and common interests today." (1) He continues, "Over the past five or six years, the relationship between the U.S. and India, from a military-to-military standpoint, has been on a steady improvement. And, it is multifaceted at this stage. It involves exercise. It involves working together on problems of common interest. And we certainly expect to see that our areas of common interest will continue to bring us together, from a military-to-military standpoint, in the months and years to come." (2)

Over the past few years, India and the United States have been getting on better than ever. Joint exercises have been conducted between U.S. and Indian forces near Agra, and the U.S has also indicated it will supply modern military equipment to India. The U.S. Ambassador to India, David C. Mulford, said in early April 2005 that the Bush Administration wants to advance Indo-U.S. strategic cooperation and has indicated that, as part of the "Indo-U.S. Strategic Partnership" deal, New Delhi would be made a party to the "expanded dialogue on missile defence". India, for its part, has decided to participate in joint naval exercises with the NATO forces in Alaska. India has something to hope for; it is aiming to be a major economic force and a key global power.

The global stature of India today as an emerging power is a result of its recent economic growth, its nuclear tests and capability, and its search for a greater role in the international system. The Lowy Institute August 2005 survey comparing India and China says a "democratic India that grows at 6 per cent a year should be congratulated for having succeeded better than a brutal anti-democratic China which grows at 10 per cent a year". (3)

Many Indians believe that India's regional pre-eminence--in size, centrality, defence capability, substantial economic potential, and political stability--is a positive factor that would help consolidate future India-U.S. relations. (4)

In fact, both parties' interests are converging and supportive of each other. The United States wishes to gain free access to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, which is possible only with Indian collaboration. The Indian Navy can be a handy instrument for policing the sea-lanes all the way from Saudi Arabia to Japan. America, therefore, feels that it is in its own interests to convert India into a powerful regional force, which suits India perfectly.

India is making desperate attempts to seek a close military and economic relationship with the United States to recover from the setback it received as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, her Cold War ally. This was evident from two episodes in 2001.

First, as soon as the Bush Administration declared it was developing a National Missile Defence, New Delhi rushed to be the first, anywhere in the world, to welcome its stand. Second, following the 9/11 terrorist attack, when the U.S. prepared to attack Afghanistan, the Vajpayee Government beat Pakistan to the draw in offering Indian military bases and facilities to the U.S. Though grateful, Washington declined since the offer would have been impractical, and Pakistan, being willing, was much more important an actor in neighbouring Afghanistan.

It is good to learn about the past. In the 1950s, the United States recruited Pakistan as an ally in its Cold War with the Soviet Union. But it also became a major aid donor to India. Indians remember how U.S. arms militarised South Asian politics, but they forget, or mostly do not know of, the massive U.S. assistance in modernising the Indian education system and triggering the green revolution in agriculture. In 1980, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan compelled the United States to revitalise its failing relations with Pakistan. But even while bolstering and using Pakistan to fight its war against the Russians, the United States did not ignore India. Washington declared itself ready to export some weapons systems to India and offered to ease Indian access to some kinds of high-tech equipment, especially computers.

So now, as U.S. forces operate out of Pakistani bases, the Americans ensure that New Delhi is kept happy by allowing Indian Navy offshore patrol vessels to escort American ships through the Strait of Malacca. Also, while the U.S. has approved sales of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan, it also offered F-18 planes and...